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Dispute Resolution Mechanisms:
An Analysis of the Indus Waters Treaty
* Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi
Abstract:
Since India and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, both states have fought
over the occupied territories of Kashmir to gain control of water supplies,
which are strategically valuable. Even in recent times, the countries are
facing constant threats from each other over several separate issues. India
and Pakistan’s water conflicts are long-standing and relate to Indian
infrastructure on the western tributaries. Pakistan is of the view that India is
robbing Pakistan’s water supplies and building its water management
capacity only as a political maneuver to gain political supremacy by
practicing hydro-hegemony. On the other hand, India maintains that it is only
constructing infrastructure within the scope of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT),
and the decreased water flows in Pakistan are due to climate change. Owing
to Indian construction works on the western rivers and the Pakistani interest
in safeguarding its water supplies, water disputes are routinely referred to the
legal mechanism prescribed in the IWT. Recently, the tension over water
conflicts between India and Pakistan has been soaring. India has threatened
that it will scrap the IWT entirely. In response, Pakistan has stated that such
a revocation of a bilaterally agreed treaty would be considered an act of war.
This extraordinary intensity in political rigidity between Pakistan and India
has a solution enshrined in the legal framework of the IWT to alleviate water
disputes. This paper seeks to explore the legal framework of the dispute
resolution mechanism under the IWT, and further investigates the weaknesses
and strengths of the prescribed mechanism.

* Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan.
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Introduction
Owing to a global surge in population and water scarcity, water conflicts
over freshwater resources are expected to increase in the future.1 Within the
next three decades the global population is estimated to grow at an alarming
rate. In 1995, the world’s population was estimated to be 5.7 billion people;2
by the year 2025, owing to the surge in population, this number will reach 8
billion people.3 This means that the constant aggregate freshwater will be
shared among an increased population and therefore global per capita water
availability is destined to decline dramatically.4
In addition to the worldwide increase in population growth and the
subsequent decline in per capita water supply, certain other contingent aspects
also account for water scarcity in the world. For example, the rise in sea level
has increased the salinity of groundwater, which has considerably diminished
water supplies.5 Similarly, the melting of the glaciers and climate change are
responsible for causing droughts and floods, which have also distressed water
supplies.6 Consequently, owing to the boost in global population and water
shortage, worldwide water disputes are expected to rise substantially in the
near future.7
Water disputes can be traced back thousands of years.8 Water conflicts
are encounters between nations because of disagreements over water
resources, for example river basins.9 It is estimated that worldwide there are
more than 250 river basins that share their waters with more than one nation.10
1

See A K CHATURVEDI, WATER: A SOURCE FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS 70 (Vij Books India Pvt ed.,
2013).
2
Jeff Crisp et al., Population and Human Relations: Year in Review 1995, ENCYC. BRITANNICA
(2017), https://www.britannica.com/science/population-biology-and-anthropology-Year-In-Review1995.
3
Nat’l Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World 19 (Nov. 2008).
4
See CHATURVEDI, supra note 1, at 70.
5
ANTOANETA YOTOVA, CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN SYSTEMS AND POLICY: V. 2, at 6 (2nd vol. 2009).
6
MARTIN PARRY, CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY
187 (2007).
7
See CHATURVEDI, supra note 1, at 70.
8
For example, the war over water in Mesopotamian city of Iraq 4,500 years ago. See MANAS
CHATTERJI, CONFLICT AND PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA 271 (B. M. Jain ed., 2008).
9
See V. J. JOHN, WATER STRUGGLE 4 (V. J. John ed., 2007).
10
More accurately, there are 263 river basins that cross international boundaries. See INES
DOMBROWSKY, CONFLICT, COOPERATION AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER
MANAGEMENT 3 (Jeroen C.J.M Van Den Bergh ed., 2007).
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Almost 40 percent of the global population lives around these river basins,11
and owing to their conflicting interests, at least 100 countries are close to
water conflict.12 More precisely, four sizable river basins are already facing
water disputes,13 and another 17 are at great risk of water conflict.14 In the
last 60 years, more than 40 water conflicts have been reported, largely in the
regions of the Middle East.15
Scholars and influential people have predicted water wars over the race
to capture water supplies. Within this context, Kofi Annan stated in 2002 that
“fierce national competition over water resources has prompted fears that
water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict.” 16 Relatedly, the vice
president of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, noted in 1995 that “[i]f the
wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be
fought over water.”17 Despite this global rise in the possibility of water wars
and water conflicts, 18 full-scale water wars have not come about because the
dispute resolution mechanism resolves such conflicts.19 Therefore, this paper
is an attempt to investigate the various dispute resolution mechanisms used in
international and regional settings to placate water conflicts between nations.
Since India and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, both states have fought
over the occupied territories of Kashmir to gain control of water supplies,
which are strategically valuable.20 Even in recent times, both countries have
faced constant threats from each other over several separate issues.21 India
11

G. TYLER MILLER, JR. & SCOTT SPOOLMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 242 (Christopher Elgado
et al. eds.,13th ed. 2010).
12
KAZUO YAMAMOTO ET AL., SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATER ENVIRONMENT 5, 207 (K. Yamamoto et al.
eds., 2013).
13
More particularly, Indus, Nile, Euphrates, Jordan, and others. See INT’L BUREAU OF THE
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 132-40 (5th
vol. 2003) [hereinafter WATER DISPUTES].
14
EDITH BROWN WEISS, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR A WATER-SCARCE WORLD 121 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2013).
15
See Id. at 122.
16
NAYAN SHARMA, RIVER SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 354 (Nayan Sharma ed., 2017).
17
VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT, at ix (2016).
18
JULIAN CRIBB, THE COMING FAMINE: THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO AVOID
IT 22 (2010).
19
ORLIN NIKOLOV & SWATHI VEERAVALLI, IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTERS ON
MILITARY ACTIVITIES 140 (Orlin Nikolov & Swathi Veeravalli eds., 2017).
20
RAVI KALIA, PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL LABYRINTHS: MILITARY, SOCIETY AND TERROR 7-8 (Ravi
Kalia ed., 2016).
21
See generally DR. S K SHAH, INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS: RENEWED THREATS AND NEW
DIRECTIONS (2017).
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and Pakistan’s water conflicts have their own long list against Indian
infrastructure on the western tributaries.22 Pakistan is of the view that India
is robbing Pakistan’s water supplies and building its water management
capacity only as a political maneuver to gain political supremacy by practicing
hydro-hegemony. 23 On the other hand, India maintains that it is only
constructing infrastructure within the scope of the Indus Waters Treaty
(“IWT”), and the decreased water flows in Pakistan are due to climate
change.24 Owing to Indian construction works on the western rivers and the
Pakistani interest in safeguarding its water supplies, water disputes are
routinely referred to the legal mechanism prescribed in the IWT.25
Recently, the tension over water conflicts between India and Pakistan has
soared. 26 India has threatened that it will scrap the IWT entirely. 27 In
response, Pakistan has stated that such a revocation of a bilaterally agreed
treaty would be considered an act of war.28 This extraordinary intensity in
political rigidity between Pakistan and India has a solution enshrined in the
legal framework of the IWT to alleviate water disputes.29
This paper seeks to explore the legal framework of the dispute resolution
mechanism under the IWT and further investigates the weaknesses and
strengths of that mechanism. To maintain impartiality, the concerns of both
nations with regard to the flaws in the dispute resolution mechanism will be
explored and weighed in the equation of exploring the suitability of the IWT
legal framework. Furthermore, to evaluate equitableness and to assess
contemporary apparatuses, the ability of the IWT dispute resolution
22

See ZAFAR ADEEL & ROBERT G. WIRSING, IMAGINING INDUSTAN 198 (Zafar Adeel & Robert G.
Wirsing eds., 2017).
23
See generally Abdul Rauf Iqbal, Hydro-Politics in India and its Impact on Pakistan, ISSRA PAPERS
(2014),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:v7wMqC6TDmwJ:www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/is
sra_pub/articles/issra-paper/ISSRA_Papers_Vol6_IssueI_2014/05-Hydro-Politics-in-India-AbdulRauf-Iqbal.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
24
CHRISTIAN PARENTI, TROPIC OF CHAOS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF
VIOLENCE 129 (20122012(e Change and the New Geography)
25
See infra Kishenganga, supra note 94; Section 4.3.
26
Iqbal, supra note 23, at 49-68.
27
Khalid Chandio, India Re-thinking Indus Water Treaty, IPRI (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.ipripak.org/india-re-thinking-indus-water-treaty/; see BHARAT VERMA, INDIAN DEFENCE
REVIEW (Bhart Verma ed., 2008); see also Revocation of Indus Waters Treaty Can Be Taken as an
Act of War: Sartaj Aziz, DAWN.COM (https://www.dawn.com/news/1286437 (last updated Sept. 27,
2016) [hereinafter Aziz].
28
Aziz, supra note 27.
29
See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IX, Sept. 19, 1960, I.U.C.N.
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mechanism to keep up with emerging modern issues will be briefly compared
with dispute resolution mechanisms in international law and other similar
treaties.
This paper is divided into five sections, as summarized below.
Section 1 will explore the dispute resolution mechanism in general. This
section is composed of two subsections. Section1.1 will succinctly explore
the juridical dispute resolution mechanism. To illustrate the benefits of the
juridical dispute resolution mechanism, certain examples with reference to
international water disputes among co-riparian states of international river
basins will be set out within this section. For instance, cases of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”), the predecessor of the the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), and the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(“PCoA”) will be briefly discussed within this subsection. Section 1.2 will
generally examine nonjuridical dispute resolution techniques and procedures.
In this subsection, notions of the fact-finding commission, mediation, and
negotiation as nonjuridical dispute resolution mechanisms will be set out
briefly.
Section 2 will briefly perceive the installed nature and type of dispute
resolution mechanisms in international river basins. This section is further
divided into three subsections. Section 2.1 will analyze the international water
basin of the Euphrates. Section 2.2 will scrutinize the international river
basins of the Nile, the Jordan, and other international river basins of
considerable size and global effect. Section 3.2 will concisely explore the
Indus Basin.
Section 3 will explore the multilayered dispute resolution mechanism
under the IWT. This section is comprised of five subsections. Section 3.1
will explore the first available forum for dispute resolution under the IWT.
Here, issues are questions of fact that are determined by the Permanent Indus
Commission (“PIC”). Section 3.2 will define the second forum of dispute
resolution under the IWT. At this stage of dispute resolution, differences
between India and Pakistan over water conflicts are to be solved through a
neutral expert. 30 Section 3.3 will examine the third stage of the dispute
resolution mechanism under the IWT. At this stage, India and Pakistan water
dispute is to be resolved through diplomatic talks and bilateral negotiations
between India and Pakistan.31 Section 3.4 will briefly explore the Court of

30
31

See Indus Water Treaty art. IX(2), supra note 29.
See Indus Water Treaty art. IX(3), supra note 29.
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Arbitration as a last resort to settle disputes between India and Pakistan under
dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT.
Section 4 of this paper will explore the efficacy of the IWT dispute
resolution mechanism. Consequently, time span/time consumed at various
stages of the resolution of certain water conflicts will be noted in the context
of Indian projects over the western waters. This section has five subsections
that will analyze the proficiency of the IWT dispute resolution mechanism
during water disputes between India and Pakistan. Section 4.1 deals with the
Salal project, Section 4.2 with the Tulbul Navigation project, Section 4.3 with
the Baglihar project, Section 4.4 with the Kishanganga project, and Section
4.5 with the Chutak project.
After this, to recommend the effective use of the dispute resolution
mechanism under the IWT, Section 5 will analyze Indian obligations under
the IWT and explore the Indian and Pakistani arguments against the
ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism. In order to build such a
nexus between the inefficacy of the legal framework under the IWT and
Indian obligations under the IWT, certain provisions of the IWT will be set
out within this section. Furthermore, brief recommendations to speed up the
existing framework to resolve water disputes will be proposed in this section.
1. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
In contemporary times, water conflicts over water utilization and water
apportionment have become more complex owing to emerging water scarcity
and prevailing needs, especially owing to water’s exceptional use in mass
food production, power production, and other similar economic utilities.32 To
cater for these evolving aspects of water conflicts, complex dispute resolution
mechanisms have been devised.33 Water conflicts in current times can be
described in the following way: there are usually two or more states in conflict
over international river basins or transboundary aquifers. 34 Typically, the
conflict is over water apportionment, water navigation, water management
projects, or border separation of international waters.35 In most cases, the
32

WEISS, supra note 14, at 122-28.
See Id.
34
JOHN, supra note 9, at 4. More accurately, there are 263 river basins that cross international
boundaries. See DOMBROWSKY, supra note 10, at 3.
35
See, e.g., European Commission of Danube Between Galatz and Braila, Advisory Opinion, 1927
PCIJ (ser. B) No. 14 (Dec. 8, 1927) [hereinafter Danube],
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.12.08_danube.htm; Case relating to the
33
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governing law is a bilaterally or multilaterally agreed treaty, and the
prescribed mechanism for dispute resolution within these mechanisms should
be followed in these cases. 36 In cases where there is no treaty, the
international law of dispute resolution is appropriate to act as a legal
framework. 37 In either case, disputes are typically referred to arbitration
courts for mediation or required to be resolved by juridical and non-juridical
dispute settlement procedures.38
There are certain legal mechanisms available in international law that can
peacefully resolve water conflicts between nations. 39 States can always
individually resolve their conflicts using diplomatic negotiations to resolve
the tensions.40 This method is usually the first available recourse to placate
international tensions.41 This forum includes approaches such as diplomatic
negotiations, mediation, fact-finding commissions, and other similar
intermediary techniques. This preliminary stage is nonbinding in nature.42
After exhausting this forum, if the dispute still remains unresolved, parties to
a conflict have the option to refer the dispute to the available legal framework
of juridical settlement. This method is binding in nature. This method
includes arbitration and judicial dispute resolution by international courts and
tribunals.43 Several agreements choose to recourse to one or both kinds of
dispute resolution mechanism. Parties to treaties agree to avail themselves of
third party mediation or juridical settlement because water conflicts involve

Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.), 1929 PCIJ
(ser. A) No. 23 (Sept. 10, 1929) [hereinafter River Order],
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1929.09.10_river_oder.htm; Diversion of Water
from Meuse (Neth. V. Belg.), 1937 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 70 (June 28),
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1937.06.28_meuse.htm; Frontier Dispute (Benin v.
Niger), 2005 I.C.J 90 (July 12),
http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/2005.07.12_frontier_dispute.htm; Certain Activities
Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area. Costa Rica v. Nicar., 2011 I.C.J.
36
Danube, supra note 35.
37
See WEISS, supra note 14, at 126–28.
38
See generally WATER DISPUTES, supra note 13.
39
For instance, dispute resolution through the PCA and the ICJ.
40
See Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29; see also United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
art. 33, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter Convention]; WEISS, supra note 14, at 128.
41
See Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29; see also Convention, supra note 40; WEISS, supra
note 14, at 128.
42
WEISS, supra note 14, at 128.
43
See Id. at 128–56.
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complex aspects of water utilization. 44 These water conflicts vary from
polluting water supplies, diverting watercourses, and building water
management infrastructure to other contingent aspects of protecting water
interests.45
Therefore, this section is divided into two subsections. Section 1.1 will
succinctly explore the juridical dispute resolution mechanism. To illustrate
the benefits of the juridical dispute resolution mechanism, certain examples
with reference to international water disputes among co-riparian states of
international river basins will be set out within this subsection. For instance,
cases of the Permanent Court of International Justice (“P.C.I.J”), the
predecessor of the I.C.J, the I.C.J., and the PCA will be briefly discussed
within this subsection.
Section 1.2 will examine generally the non-juridical dispute resolution
techniques and procedures. In this subsection, notions of fact-finding
commissions, mediation, and negotiation as non-juridical dispute resolution
mechanisms will be set out briefly.
1.1. Juridical Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
International law provides several venues to accommodate dispute
resolution between states. Various international conventions and treaty laws
have anticipated a need for a juridical and diplomatic legal mechanism to
resolve international disputes.46 In time, states have brought their issues to
these forums to resolve their issues judicially.47
1.1.1. Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) Cases
Up until the establishment of the I.C.J., the P.C.I.J. dealt with
international disputes between states.48 Both courts have adjudicated over
44

Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29. See also Convention, supra note 40; WEISS, supra note
14, at 128.
45
See WEISS, supra note 14, at 128–56.
46
See Id. at 128–30.
47
See Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (June 28)
[hereinafter Meuse]; see also Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.), Judgement, 2009 I.C.J. 213 (July 13) [hereinafter Dispute]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills]; Rhine Chlorides
Arbitration (Neth./Fr.), No. 2000-02, Award, Perm. Ct. Arb. (2004).
48
ALEXANDER MIKABERIDZE, ATROCITIES, MASSACRES, AND WAR CRIMES 291 (Alexander
Mikaberidze ed., vol. 1, 2013).
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cases of water apportionment, water navigation, water demarcation, and
interpretation of treaty laws among co-riparian states.49
For instance, in 1927 the P.C.I.J. gave its advisory opinion to demarcate
jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, between Galatz and
Braila about the navigation of watercourses.50
In a very similar case, in 1929 the P.C.I.J. concluded its International
Commission of the River Oder between Germany, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Sweden and Czechoslovakia and Poland, regarding the navigability
of the river waters.51 This case was brought to interpret the scope of Articles
331, 241, and 343 of the Treaty of Versailles.52
Similarly, in the case between Britain and Belgium, the P.C.I.J. decided
the legitimacy of water navigation in 1934, this case is also known as the
Oscar Chin case.53 Further, the PCIJ adjudicated over the navigability of the
River Meuse, between the Netherlands and Belgium, in 1937.54 This case also
required the PCIJ to assess the violation of a treaty between the Netherlands
and Belgium that was agreed in 1863.55 Both states contended that other party
violated treaty law by diverting waterfalls and constructing water
management infrastructure. 56 The court concluded that both parties could
build as many canals as they wanted, so long as the inflow and outflow from
the river stayed unchanged and their actions remained aligned with the
principles laid down in the treaty.57
All the aforementioned cases required juridical resolution of the
navigability of international watercourses. Three cases required PCIJ to
interpret mutually agreed treaties among co-riparian states to resolve water
disputes.58

49

See Di Meuse, supra note 47; Dispute, supra note 47; Pulp Mills, supra note 47.
Danube, supra note 35.
51
River Order, supra note 35.
52
Id.
53
Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgement, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12).
54
Meuse, supra note 47, at 5.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 46.
57
Id. at 18.
58
See LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 204–09 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2015) (2013); WEISS, supra note 14, at 128–56.
50
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1.1.2. International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Later, the ICJ took charge of providing a mechanism to settle international
conflicts, and it also adjudicated in water conflicts between states.59 In 1997,
the ICJ ruled on the water conflict against the project of Gabcikovo
Nagymoros by interpreting the 1977 treaty between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.60 Both states agreed to construct a joint project to manage
waters and produce hydropower. 61 Owing to internal pressure, Hungary
declined to continue any works, and Czechoslovakia separately commenced
its works to divert Danube river water flows under the project Variant C,
against the interests of Hungary, and started to build two water management
and hydropower production projects on the same waters.62 Subsequently, in
1977 Hungary sent notification of the termination of the 1977 treaty to
Czechoslovakia.63 To resolve the water conflict, both states agreed to a new
agreement in 1993, under which both states agreed to submit their issue to the
authority of the ICJ to resolve their conflict.64 In 1997, the ICJ ruled that,
while Hungary had notified of the termination of the 1977 treaty, it remained
in force, and Czechoslovakia was not entitled to operate the Variant C
project.65
Similarly, in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case in 1999 the ICJ adjudicated
on the navigability of water flows.66 In this case, the ICJ was required to
interpret the boundaries prescribed within the bilaterally agreed treaty
between Botswana and Namibia.67 Likewise, in 2002 the ICJ ruled over the
boundary demarcation in a bilateral agreement, in the case of Cameroon v.
Nigeria. 68 In Benin v. Niger, the ICJ was asked in 1999 to demarcate

59

CHAZOURNES, supra note 58.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 140, ¶ 67 (Sept. 25)
[hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros].
61
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 60, at 23.
62
Id. at 25.
63
Id. at 27.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 239.
66
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. V. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, 1184, ¶ 91 (Dec. 13)
[hereinafter Kasikili].
67
Kasikili, supra note 67, at 1045.
68
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), Order, 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 303, 303, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10).
60
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boundaries across the river waters of the Niger and Mekrou Rivers and the
control of twenty-five islands between Benin and Niger.69
Later, in 2011, ICJ settled the water dispute between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua over the water pollution derangement of the San Juan river
waters.70 The Court ruled that both states must refrain from aggravating the
conflict, and both states could only send their civilian personnel to protect the
environment.71 Both nations had already experienced another case regarding
the same river waters in the same court in 2005.72 In this case, Costa Rica
claimed that Nicaragua had violated Article 4 of their 1858 treaty with respect
to its navigation rights.73 The Court in this case ruled that it was Nicaragua’s
obligation to notify Costa Rica and respect its customary right.74
In 2010, the ICJ made an international ruling on the case of Argentina v.
Uruguay, which is most commonly known as the Pulp Mills case.75 In this
case, Argentina was concerned with water pollution by Uruguay in the waters
of the Uruguay River, and it claimed that Uruguay had violated their 1975
bilaterally agreement.76 The court in that case maintained that Uruguay had
indeed violated its procedural obligation to notify Argentina of its works over
river waters, and established a general rule of international law that it is
mandatory for states to prepare environmental impact assessment (EIA)
reports for projects before commencing work.77
1.1.3. Arbitration
Arbitration courts are also used to resolve water disputes between states,
particularly because rulings through this forum are binding in nature.78 The
nature of water conflicts referred to a court of arbitration or tribunal varies
69

Frontier Dispute, supra note 35, at 103, ¶ 17.
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Order, 2011
I.C.J. Rep. 6, 19, ¶ 55 (Mar. 8) [hereinafter Costa Rica v. Nicar. 2011].
71
Id. at 21, ¶ 62.
72
Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Order, 2005 I.C.J. (Nov.
29) [hereinafter Costa Rica v. Nicar. 2005].
73
Id.
74
I.C.J., Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua): Overview of
the Case, ICJ (Oct. 1, 2017), http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/133.
75
Pulp Mills, supra note 47.
76
Id. at 25.
77
Id. at 82.
78
See CHAZOURNES, supra note 58, at 209–12.
70

86

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol18/iss1/4

12

Qureshi: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: An Analysis of the Indus Waters T

[Vol. 18: 75, 2018]

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

from disputes over water navigation, diversion of watercourses, hydropower
project legality, water management structures, and demarcation of boundaries
to other similar water utilization disputes.79 Among all referred cases in the
PCA, most concern the demarcation of boundaries in international rivers.80
Other disputes are chiefly about lower riparian states’ concerns regarding
upper riparian states’ diversion of water flows.81 Only one or two arbitrations
addressed the legality of hydropower production structures or assessments of
environmental protection concerning the environment, floods, and soil
corrosion.82
Set out below are details about these water disputation cases in arbitration.
One case of water dispute was referred to a British Commissioner in 1872; it
was a case between Afghanistan and Persia over the water flows of the
Helmand River Delta.83 The same states were in dispute over the same waters
again in 1905.84 Another arbitration over water conflicts was disputed in 1888
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the waters of the San Juan River.85
Then, in 1893, Russia and Britain sought arbitration over the Kushk river
waters.86 Other cases include Venezuela v. Germany, over the Faber River in
1903;87 the Gut Dam case between Canada and the United States;88 the 1925
Tacna Arica case between Chile and Peru;89 the 1945 Zarumilla River case
between Ecuador and Peru;90 the 1957 Lake Lanoux case between Spain and
France;91 the 1977 Beagle Channel case between Argentina and Chile;92 the

79

See CHAZOURNES, supra note 58.
See Id.
81
WEISS, supra note 14, at 133–34.
82
See Id. at 134-35.
83
Helmand River Delta (Afg. v. Persia), General Goldsmid Award, 1872 P.I.C.J (Aug. 19).
84
Id.
85
San Juan River (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), President Grover Cleveland Award, 1888 P.I.C.J (Mar. 22).
86
Kushk River (Gr. Brit.v. Russ.), Anglo-Russian Comm. Award, 1893 P.I.C.J (Sept. 3).
87
Faber (Ger. v. Venez.), Henry M. Duffield Award, 1903 P.I.C.J (Feb. 13).
88
Gut Dam Arbitration (Can. v. U.S.), Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal (1968).
89
Tacna-Arica (Chile v. Peru), President Calvin Coolidge Award, 1925 P.I.C.J (Mar. 4).
80

90

Zarumilla River (Peru v. Ecuador), Chancellery of Braz. Award, 1945 P.I.C.J (July 14).
Lake Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 24 I.L.R 101 (1957).
92
See Rep. Int’l Arbiral Awards, Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle
Channel, U.N. Doc. (1977), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf.
91
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2004 case between the Netherlands and France; 93 and the Kishanganga
project case between of India and Pakistan, 94 over Indus river waters.95
1.2. Nonjuridical Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Nonjuridical dispute resolution methods are usually the first available
recourses to placate international tensions. This forum includes approaches
such as diplomatic negotiations, mediation, fact-finding commissions, and
other similar intermediary techniques; this preliminary stage is nonbinding in
nature. 96 This subsection will generally examine nonjuridical dispute
resolution techniques and procedures. Within this scope, notions such as factfinding commissions, mediation, and negotiation as nonjuridical dispute
resolution mechanisms will be set out briefly.
1.2.1. Fact-Finding Commissions
Fact-finding commissions are formed by mutual agreement through
conventions and treaties to establish disputed facts and pacify disagreements
over facts or questions, which if established would violate treaty or laws.97
The commissions comprise neutral members, or commissioners, from each
party state, and in some cases a chairman.98 These commissions are tasked to
resolve water disputes at a preliminary stage by agreement. 99 Thus, these
commissions act as dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve water conflicts
between nations. 100 International organizations and treaty agreements
between nations routinely form these commissions to resolve their disputes.101
93

Rhine Chlorides Arbitration (Neth. v. Fr.), Case No. 2000-02 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004).
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Case No. 2011-01 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013)
[hereinafter Kishenganga].
95
CHAZOURNES, supra note 58, at 134–35.
96
Id. at 209-12; see also WEISS, supra note 14, at 128.
97
WEISS, supra note 14, at 135–36.
98
Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.: OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 17-21 (2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf [hereinafter
Commissions on Inquiry].
99
WEISS, supra note 14, at 135–136.
100
Article
33,
UN
WATERCOURSES
CONVENTION:
ONLINE
USERS
GUIDE,
http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/the-convention/part-vi-miscellaneous-provisions/article33-settlement-of-disputes/33-1-7-fact-finding-and-inquiry/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
101
WEISS, supra note 14, at 136-37.
94
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For instance, the Bi-national International Joint Commission was formed to
reconcile disputes between the United States and Canada through the
Boundary Waters Treaty, 1909.102 In total, 51 disputes were referred to this
commission regarding water disputes between the United States and
Canada. 103 Similarly, the PIC was formed between India and Pakistan
through the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.104 This commission comprises two
commissioners, and India and Pakistan have one commissioner each on this
commission. 105 Likewise, the United Nations Watercourses Convention
(“UNWC”) also establishes a fact-finding commission to resolve disputes
among parties.106 This commission comprises one commissioner from each
party to the UNWC, with one neutral chairman.107
1.2.2. Mediation
Mediation is also used as a forum to resolve disputes between nations.108
In this form of mechanism, a neutral person assumes responsibility for
mediating or conciliating disputes between nations, upon the mutual
agreement of the parties. 109 The scope of mediation is not restricted to
establishing facts, but it can offer solutions regarding disputes where these
proposed solutions are not necessarily binding in nature.110 The appointment
of a neutral expert under the IWT is an example of a mediator to resolve water
disputes between India and Pakistan. Under the IWT, the appointment of a
neutral expert is a forum of dispute resolution.111
1.2.3. Negotiations
The most general and most frequently used dispute resolution mechanism
is through negotiations between conflicting states.112 Negotiations, bilateral
102

See generally Boundary Waters Treaty art. VIII, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
WEISS, supra note 14, at 136.
104
See generally Indus Water Treaty, supra note 29.
105
See Indus Water Treaty art. VIII & IX, supra note 29.
106
Convention, supra note 40.
107
See generally Convention, supra note 40.
108
WEISS, supra note 14, at 139-42.
109
Id.
110
See Id.
111
Indus Water Treaty art. IX, annexure F, supra note 29.
112
See WEISS, supra note 14, at 142.
103
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talks, and diplomatic negotiations are employed by all countries to resolve
their conflicts in a peaceful and cost-effective manner through mutual
agreement.113
Various conventions and treaties have made it obligatory for conflicting
states to first exhaust the dispute resolution mechanism of negotiations before
resorting to other forums of the dispute resolution framework. For instance,
Article 33 of the UNWC makes it obligatory for parties to resort to
negotiations if one party wishes to solve the conflict through bilateral talks,
only if conflicting states have not already agreed to resolve their issue by other
means of the dispute resolution mechanism.114 Likewise, Article IX of the
IWT makes it obligatory to exhaust the forum of negotiations as a dispute
resolution mechanism to resolve a conflict through mutual agreement before
resorting to the Court of Arbitration or a neutral expert.115
2. Dispute Resolution Mechanism in International River Basins
There are nearly 100 water conflicts over water apportionment, water
utilization, water navigation, and water management of international river
basins shared by two or more co-riparian states.116 Generally, lower riparian
states are keen to safeguard their water rights from water poaching by upper
riparian states.117 However, for the scope of this section, only the governing
laws and agreements of certain international river basins will be explored to
determine existing dispute resolution mechanisms in certain international
rivers basins. Stephen McCafferey has noted that international water basins
and their water disputes can be categorized into three types of sceneries.118
These settings include: (a) water disputes, where there is no mutual agreement
between nations to share international watercourses; (b) circumstances where
there is a mutually agreed treaty; and (c) situations where there is an agreed
treaty among co-riparian states, but it is not functional in the current setting.119

113

CHAZOURNES, supra note 58, at 216-17.
Convention, supra note 40, at 713-14.
115
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 150-52.
116
See WEISS, supra note 14, at 121–22.
117
ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 198.
118
Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for Resolving Them,
in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 49, 53 (The Int’l Bureau of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration ed., 2003).
119
McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 53.
114
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By analyzing current political relations among states, McCaffrey has
categorized several river basins into these classes.120 Through this analysis of
classification, the governing dispute resolution mechanism is determined.121
This section of the paper comprises three subsections. Section 2.1 will
analyze the international water basin of the Euphrates. Section 2.2 will
scrutinize the international river basins of the Nile, the Jordan, and other
international basins of considerable size and global effect. Section 2.3 will
explore the Indus River Basin.
2.1. Euphrates River Basin
Stephen McCaffrey’s categories can be used to see the current status of
international river basins. For instance, in the river basin of the Euphrates, it
can be seen that there are several treaties that describe the legal framework of
this basin, but there is no multilateral, holistic treaty that governs the
principles of water apportionment in the basin among all co-riparian states.122
Furthermore, he adds, owing to the Turkish hegemonic race to capture water
supplies and given the uncertain security situation in lower riparian states,
such as Syria and Iraq, water apportionment cooperation is unlikely.123
2.2. Jordan, Nile, and Other River Basins
Similarly, McCaffrey has noted the status of other river basins with regard
to their governing legal framework.124 The international watercourse basin of
the Nile and Jordan Rivers, sharing watercourses with Lebanon, Israel,
Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, are seen as international river
basins with no holistic legal framework for water apportionment.125 Several
bilaterally agreed treaties have narrowed down the scope of water sharing in
these regions and basins.126
Relatedly, he notes that in the international river basins of the Amudarya,
the Danube, the Rhine, the Rio Grande, and the Syrdarya, the existing legal
framework is no longer functional. He adds that the international river basins
120

Id.
Id.
122
See Id. at 54–55.
123
See Id.
124
See Id. at 52.
125
See Id. at 55-60.
126
See Id.
121

91

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2018

17

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4

[Vol. 18: 75, 2018]

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

of the Flathead, the Ganges, the Mekong, the Skagit, and the Indus Rivers
have functional legal frameworks.127
2.3. Indus River Basin
The Indus River Basin is shared primarily by India and Pakistan.128
India is an upper riparian state to Pakistan.129 Both countries have agreed to
the IWT,130 which is still functional after more than half a century.131 The
IWT is considered a landmark success story in the field of water-sharing
agreements across the globe, as both hostile nations agreed to equitably
resolve their water disputes, and the treaty has survived several wars between
the states.132
Since India and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, both states have
fought over the occupied territories of Kashmir to gain control of water
supplies, which are strategically valuable. 133 Even in recent times, both
countries have faced constant threats from each side over several separate
issues.134 Many water conflicts are disputes relating to Indian infrastructure
on the western tributaries.135 The western rivers were allocated, under the
IWT, for the unrestricted use of Pakistan, while the eastern rivers were
allocated for the unrestricted use of India.136 Pakistan is of the view that India
is robbing Pakistani supplies and building its water-management capacity
only as a political maneuver to gain political supremacy by practicing hydrohegemony.137 On the other hand, India maintains that it is only constructing
infrastructure within the scope of the IWT, and the decreased water flows in

127

See Id. at 74–84.
Afghanistan and China also share the Indus Basin with Pakistan and India, however they share a
relatively smaller geographical area. See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 6.
129
See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 198.
130
Indus Water Treaty, supra note 29
131
See McCaffrey, supra note 115, at 78–80.
132
BRAHMA CHELLANEY, WATER: ASIA’S NEW BATTLEGROUND 278 (Geo. Univ. Press 2013).
133
KALIA, supra note 20, at 8.
134
See generally SHAH, supra note 21.
135
See generally ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22.
136
See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 130-36.
137
See generally Iqbal, supra note 23.
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Pakistan are due to climate change.138 Therefore, water disputes are routinely
referred to the legal mechanism prescribed in the IWT.139
For these reasons, both states are still facing certain challenges. Within
the parameters prescribed in the IWT, India believes that Pakistan has no basis
to object to its construction works, obtain stay orders, and delay the
construction works.140 And, through these delays in construction works the
actual and opportunity costs of projects are borne by the Indian state, which
is injuring Indian interests and economy. 141 On the other side, Pakistan
maintains that the dispute-resolution mechanism is very slow, and by the time
the case reaches the highest forum either the project has been completed, or it
has incurred so much cost that it cannot be held back.142 And, even if the
court sides with Pakistan, all it does is make slight changes to a few designs
of Indian projects.143
The Indian state is exasperated with Pakistan’s frequent objections and
feels that the IWT is an impediment to its interests.144 Therefore, India has
threatened that it will scrap the IWT entirely.145 In response, Pakistan has
stated that a revocation of a bilaterally-agreed treaty would be considered an
act of war.146 To communicate state interests with regard to water disputes,
the PIC has been tasked with communicating with each state. 147 This
extraordinary intensity in political rigidity between Pakistan and India has an
enshrined legal framework to alleviate water disputes.148 The IWT is an anvil
to mold sustainability in the region, where both states know that other water
is intrinsic, and therefore the other party will not let go of its legal and innate
rights.149
138

PARENTI, supra note 24, at 129.
See Kishenganga, supra note 94.
140
See generally Rizwan Ullah Kokab & Adnan Nawaz, Indus Water Treaty: Need for Review, 2
ASIAN J. OF SOC. SCI. & HUMAN (2013).
141
Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213–14 (2013), see also MUHAMMAD ADEEL, INDUS WATER
TREATY AND THE CASE FOR HYDRO-HEGEMONY 4 (2016); Iqbal, supra note 23.
142
Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 212-13.
143
See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 4; see also Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213–14;
Kishenganga, supra note 94.
144
Chandio, supra note 27.
145
Id. See also VERMA, supra note 27; Aziz, supra note 27.
146
Aziz, supra note 27.
147
Id. See also Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29.
148
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29.
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See McCaffrey, supra note 115, at 78–80.
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This paper seeks to explore the legal framework of dispute resolution
under the IWT, and further investigates the weaknesses and strengths of the
prescribed mechanism. To maintain impartiality, the concerns of both nations
with regard to flaws in the dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT will be
explored and weighed in the equation of exploring the suitability of the IWT
legal framework. Furthermore, to evaluate equitableness and to assess
contemporary apparatuses, the IWT dispute resolution mechanism’s ability to
keep up with emerging modern issues will be briefly compared with
international law and other similar treaties.
3. The Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the IWT
This section will explore the multilayered dispute resolution mechanism
under the IWT. This section comprises five subsections. Section 3.1 will
explore the first available forum for dispute resolution under the IWT. Here,
issues are questions of fact that are determined by the PIC. Section 3.2 will
set out the second forum of dispute resolution under the IWT. At this stage
of dispute resolution, differences between India and Pakistan over water
conflicts are to be solved through a neutral expert. Section 3.3 will examine
the third stage of the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT. At this
stage, India and Pakistan’s water dispute is to be resolved through diplomatic
talks and bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. Section 3.4 will
briefly explore the Court of Arbitration as a last resort to settle a dispute
between India and Pakistan under the dispute resolution mechanism of the
IWT. Finally, Section 3.5 will define the dispute resolution mechanism
comprehensively, to conclude this section.
Holistically, the dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT is enshrined
under Article IX of the IWT, which prescribes a multilayered dispute
resolution mechanism to resolve water conflicts between India and
Pakistan.150
3.1. Stage One: The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC)
Article IX(1) of the IWT reads as follows: “Any question which arises
between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty
or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of
this Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission, which will endeavor

150

Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, art. IX, at 150–52.
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to resolve the question by agreement.”151 At stage one, if any question is
raised by either party regarding the interpretation of the IWT or any fact that,
if established, may violate the IWT, then this question will be dealt with by
the PIC. 152 At this stage, the PIC will try to resolve the question by
agreement.153
The PIC is formed by and derives its powers and obligations from Article
VIII of the IWT.154 Under this provision, Pakistan and India each nominate a
highly qualified engineer in the area of hydrology and water utilization as a
commissioner.155 Both commissioners are representatives of their respective
governments and are responsible for meeting obligations under Article VIII
of the IWT.156 For example, all communication regarding the IWT should be
managed through the commissioner.157 These commissioners are responsible
for exchanging relevant data, notices, and other duties assigned by their
states.158 Together, both commissioners form the PIC.159 This commission is
responsible for settling any raised question of interpretation or fact that, if
established, might violate a provision of the IWT. 160 Furthermore, either
commissioner can request the other to inspect the relevant rivers and its
projects.161 They are obliged under the IWT to conduct a meeting together at
least once a year, and are given certain immunities to be able to work
effectively. 162 Furthermore, each commissioner is obliged to submit their
report to their respective government annually, and also can submit timely
reports with regard to their own assessment.163 In addition, the commissioners
themselves determine all of their procedures.164

151

Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(1), supra note 29, at 150.
Id.
153
Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII, supra note 29, at 146.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
159
Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(3), supra note 29, at 146.
160
Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII, supra note 29, at 148.
161
Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(4), supra note 29, at 148.
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Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(5), supra note 29, at 148.
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Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(8), supra note 29, at 150
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Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(10), supra note 29, at 150.
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If the question is not resolved by the first available forum of the PIC, then
the question will be solved through the higher forum of stage two.165
3.2. Stage Two: Neutral Expert
For the second stage, Article IX(2) of the IWT reads as follows:
If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the questions
mentioned in Paragraph (1), then a difference will be deemed to have arisen,
which shall be dealt with as follows: (a) Any difference which, in the opinion
of either Commissioner, falls within the provisions of Part I of Annexure F
shall, at the request of either Commissioner, be dealt with by a Neutral Expert
in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F.166
Under this provision, if the PIC does not resolve the question of fact that
may have constituted a breach of the IWT, and the PIC has failed to reach an
agreement, then a “difference” has arisen between India and Pakistan. At this
stage, the difference is to be solved through a neutral expert.167
When a difference has arisen, upon the notification of any commissioner
from the PIC a highly qualified engineer is to be appointed as a neutral expert
within a month, by the mutual agreement of both governments of India and
Pakistan.168 If the governments fail to agree on the appointment of a neutral
expert, then it is the responsibility of the World Bank to appoint a neutral
expert.169 Furthermore, the term of appointment of the neutral expert is also
fixed.170 During the transition period, the World Bank will appoint the neutral
expert, and following this period, both governments will appoint a new neutral
expert together. 171 When a difference has arisen, after two weeks a
commissioner will notify the relevant authority to appoint a neutral expert,
and send a copy to the other commissioner.172 The neutral expert can only
determine any procedure to solve difference after hearing both sides,

165

Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(2), supra note 29, at 150.
Id.
167
Id.
168
Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(5), supra note 29, at 152.
169
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 150, 202.
170
Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F, supra note 29, at 206.
171
Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F(4), supra note 29, at 206.
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Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F(5), supra note 29, at 206.
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adequately. 173 Furthermore, the issue of financial compensation for the
neutral is enumerated to avoid prejudice.174
The Neutral Expert is employed to determine whether part of the
difference, no part of the difference, or all-inclusive differences fall within the
category of the dispute.175 The decision of a Neutral Expert is binding in
nature; it is even binding on the Court of Arbitration.176 However, if any
conflicting issue is out of the scope of competency of the Neutral Expert, it
will be dealt with at the later stages of dispute resolution mechanism under
the IWT.177
In other words, if the neutral expert fails to resolve the difference, then
the conflict will reach the third available forum to resolve the issue.178
3.3. Stage Three: Negotiations
For the third stage, Article IX(2)(b) of the IWT reads as follows:
If the difference does not come within the provisions of Paragraph (2) (a),
or if a Neutral Expert, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 7 of
Annexure F, has informed the Commission that, in his opinion, the difference,
or a part thereof, should be treated as a dispute, then a dispute will be deemed
to have arisen which shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
Paragraphs (3), (4)[,] and (5)[] [p]rovided that, at the discretion of the
Commission, any difference may either be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in
accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F or be deemed to be a
dispute to be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs (3), (4)
and (5), or may be settled in any other way agreed upon by the Commission.179
At this third stage, the difference has not yet resolved and the Neutral
Expert communicates to the PIC that a “dispute” has arisen between India and
Pakistan.180 However, it is pertinent to note that, at this stage, it is the PIC’s
discretion to choose whether the conflict is resolved through a Neutral Expert,
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Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F, supra note 29, at 206.
Id. at 208–10.
175
Id. at 202.
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Id. at 208.
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Id.
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See generally Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29.
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Indus Water Treaty art. IX(2)(b), supra note 29, at 150.
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by bilateral diplomatic talks, or through arbitration.181 Article IX(3) and (4)
of the IWT reads as follows:
As soon as a dispute to be settled in accordance with this and the
succeeding paragraphs of this Article has arisen, the Commission shall, at the
request of either Commissioner, report the fact to the two Governments, as
early as practicable, stating in its report the points on which the Commission
is in agreement and the issues in dispute, the views of each Commissioner on
these issues and his reasons therefor.
[] Either Government may, following receipt of the report referred to in
Paragraph (3), or if it comes to the conclusion that this report is being unduly
delayed in the Commission, invite the other Government to resolve the dispute
by agreement. In doing so it shall state the names of its negotiators and their
readiness to meet with the negotiators to be appointed by the other
Government at a time and place to be indicated by the other Government. To
assist in these negotiations, the two Governments may agree to enlist the
services of one or more mediators acceptable to them.182
Thus, as soon as the PIC has received notification of a dispute, it is then
the duty of the commissioners of the PIC to communicate to both governments
about the agreements of the issue, if any, and to report the dispute that has
arisen, coupled with the reasoning of each commissioner.183 At this stage, the
forum to resolve the dispute is through governmental “diplomatic
negotiations.”184 To obtain resolution through negotiations, each government
can appoint negotiators and fix a date and time to proceed with bilateral
talks.185 To provide further support for these bilateral talks, both states can
use mediation to reconcile water disputes, and can appoint mediators through
mutual agreement.186
3.4. Stage Four: Arbitration
If the dispute is not resolved through mediation or negotiations by
diplomatic talks, then the dispute can be referred for arbitration.187 Article
IX(5) and(6) of the IWT reads as follows:
181

See generally, Id.
Indus Water Treaty art. IX(3)-(4), supra note 29, at 150-52.
183
Indus Water Treaty arts. VIII & IX, supra note 29.
184
Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29.
185
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5) A court of Arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute in the
manner provided by Annexure G
a) upon agreement between the Parties to do so; or
b) at the request of either Party, if, after negotiations have begun pursuant
to Paragraph (4), in its opinion the dispute is not likely to be resolved by
negotiation or mediation; or
c) at the request of either Party, if, after the expiry of one month following
receipt by the other Government of the invitation referred to in Paragraph (4).
that Party comes to the conclusion that the other Government is unduly
delaying the negotiations.
6) The provisions of Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) shall not apply to any
difference while it is being dealt with by a Neutral Expert.188
Under this provision, both parties can refer the water dispute for
arbitration if the negotiations or mediation have failed to resolve the water
conflict.189 Even at the request of one party, a dispute can be referred for
arbitration if the negotiations have failed to resolve the dispute. 190 More
specifically, the case can be referred for arbitration where one party after the
completion of a one-month notification considers that the negotiations
between the parties have been unduly delayed.191
When under Article IX, a need for a Court of Arbitration (“CoA”) arises,
and both states must carry out a special agreement to establish it and lay down
its procedures and its composition at the request of either party. 192 If the
parties do not agree to the composition of the CoA, then the CoA will
comprise of seven members.193 Each state appoints two arbitrators, and the
remaining three arbitrators will be umpires appointed by a lengthy procedure
provided in Annexure G of the Indus Water Treaty that requires a panel or
governmental agreement of both parties.194 Any decision reached by the court
majority will be held binding on both parties regarding the resolution of the
referred dispute.195 To reach this decision, unless otherwise agreed by both

188
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190
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parties, the CoA can rely on the IWT, the international convention to which
both India and Pakistan are parties and customary international law.196
3.5. Reflection
To conclude, the mechanism of dispute resolution in the IWT involves
several stages, including a permanent commission, the Neutral Expert,
diplomatic negotiations, and international arbitration. Basically, the IWT has
a four-layer dispute resolution mechanism, where each layer encompasses a
forum to settle the dispute peacefully. 197 At the first stage, a permanent
commission under the IWT resolves any question of fact that if established
could violate the provisions of the IWT.198 The difference of interests and
objections of a party are termed as a “question” in the first stage, which is to
be resolved by the PIC.199 If the commission fails to resolve the question
raised, then a “difference” has arisen and the parties are in the second issue
resolution forum; the “difference” between India and Pakistan under the IWT
is resolved by mediation, through a neutral expert, which is the second forum
to resolve an issue. In the third stage, if the neutral expert fails to resolve the
“difference,” then a “dispute” has arisen between these two states, which must
be resolved by diplomatic negotiations between both parties, by mediation, or
by the CA at the discretion of the commission. 200 This means that, if the
dispute is not resolved by governmental negotiations or mediation, the fourth
and last stage in the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT is to resolve
a water dispute between India and Pakistan through the CA.201 Stage four is
the highest available forum under the IWT to resolve water conflicts between
India and Pakistan.202 The CA can rely on the IWT, international conventions
to which both India and Pakistan are parties, and customary international
law.203
Furthermore, the immersion of international law in the CA makes it a
platform that encompasses emerging issues, while accommodating
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developing water apportionment principles and rules. For instance, in the
Kishenganga case, the PCA relied on the case law of the Pulp Mills case.204
Furthermore, the multilayered dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT
is in congruity with international laws and universally acclaimed rules. For
example, Article 33 of the UNWC also allows parties to use several stages of
forums to resolve their disputes. Article 33 of the UNWC offers a range of
dispute resolution mechanisms, which involves bilateral agreements,
negotiations, mediation, conciliation, and obligatory fact-finding joint
commissions.205 However, both India and Pakistan have reservations about
the UNWC, most specifically with the binding and compulsory nature of
Article 33.206
The multilayered dispute resolution under the IWT is a reflection of
acceptable forums and techniques of international law and globally practiced
customs. Examples of these techniques and customs under the IWT include:
the role of a neutral expert for mediation, the obligation of the PIC as a
permanent joint fact-finding commission, the involvement of mediation and
negotiations as diplomatic negotiations and mediation, and the establishment
of the CA;207 all are widely used dispute resolution mechanisms to placate
water conflicts around the world.
It is pertinent to note that the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT
employs undertakes both juridical and non-juridical techniques to settle
differences and disputes between India and Pakistan. By allowing a four-layer
legal dispute resolution framework, the IWT encompasses almost all binding
and nonbinding legal procedures to settle water conflicts,208 except for the
dispute resolution forum of the ICJ because the IWT deliberately does not
accommodate the ICJ as a legal forum to settle disputes. Apart from this, the
IWT gives substantial consideration to bilateral agreements and diplomatic
negotiations as nonbinding forums to settle disputes,209 and affords arbitration
and neutral experts binding authority in settling disputes.210
204

See Kishenganga, supra note 94.
Convention, supra note 40.
206
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4. Efficacy of the IWT Dispute Resolution Mechanism211
India and Pakistan have routinely maintained that the IWT dispute
resolution mechanism is an impediment to justice.212 On the one hand, India
argues that Pakistan’s frequent objections to every Indian project raise the
costs of these projects, by delaying their construction processes.213 On the
other hand, Pakistan maintains that India does not inform Pakistan of the
commencement of Indian hydraulic construction projects on the western
waters, which is in violation of IWT.214 Pakistan adds that, whenever an issue
has been raised in dispute resolution forums under the IWT, India has
repeatedly pressed Pakistan toward bilateral talks, as a delaying tactic to
complete its construction works of projects, so that major issues remain
unresolved after the completion of a project. 215 This is mainly because
adjudications tend to hold back the raised issues if the project has incurred so
much cost or is completed.216
For these reasons, this section explores the efficacy of the dispute
resolution mechanism under the IWT. Consequently, time spent consumed at
specific stages of the dispute resolution will be noted in the context of certain
water conflicts over Indian projects on western waters. This section has five
subsections that will analyze the proficiency of the IWT dispute resolution
mechanism during the water disputes between India and Pakistan. Section 4.1
deals with the Salal project, Section 4.2 with the Tulbul Navigation project,
Section 4.3 with the Baglihar project, Section 4.4 with the Kishenganga
project, and Section 4.5 with the Chutak project.
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See Asif Baig Mirza, Performances of Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the Indus Waters Treaty,
PILDAT, (Sept. 2013)
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/PerformanceofDisputeResolutionMechanismofthe
IndusWatersTreaty_BackgroundPaper.pdf.
212
Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213-14; see also Iqbal, supra note 23, at 110.
213
Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213–14.
214
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. IX, Annexure D at ¶ 9, and Annexure E at ¶ 12. India
is obliged to inform Pakistan of the commencement of any construction works over the western waters
at least six months before any works starts. Id.
215
Indus Water Dispute Going to Arbitration Again, THE THIRD POLE (July 18, 2016).
https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/07/18/indus-water-dispute-going-to-arbitrators-again/ [hereinafter
The Third Pole].
216
See Kishenganga, supra note 94.

102

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol18/iss1/4

28

Qureshi: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: An Analysis of the Indus Waters T

[Vol. 18: 75, 2018]

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

4.1. Salal Dam Project
Under the IWT, Pakistan raised its first objection to an Indian project in
July 1970,217 after the design of the Salal hydropower production project was
shared with Pakistan in April 1970. 218 This project was planned for the
Chenab River,219 which is a western river.220 Western rivers are allocated for
the unrestricted use of Pakistan.221 The Pakistani issues were not resolved
through the PIC. In 1974, the PIC communicated its incapability to resolve
the matter. The conflict “was taken to the governmental level in 1975,” and
through bilateral diplomatic talks of negotiations between India and Pakistan
the issue was resolved in 1978, when India agreed to make the necessary
changes in the design of the Salal project.222 It is interesting to note that the
dispute resolution mechanism in its very first case took eight years, 1970–
1978, to resolve the conflict.
4.2. Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage
The Tulbul Navigation project—Pakistan prefers to refer to it as the
Wullar Barrage—was designed over the western Jhelum River and was the
subject of Pakistan’s second reservation.223 Under the IWT, India is obliged
to inform Pakistan of any construction work over the western waters. 224
However, India commenced its construction of the Tulbul Navigation Project
in 1984 without sharing its designs or plans and without even informing
Pakistan of the commencement of any construction works.225 The relevant
reports were shared with Pakistan in 1986, after governmental pressure. 226
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Temporarily, India stayed its construction works on this project in 1987.227
However, sources believe that India has resumed its construction works, and
the works at this site are proceeding at full pace.228 The PIC failed to resolve
this issue and the negotiation between the two states over this project has
consumed more than 16 rounds of bilateral talks.229 Pakistan has maintained
that commencement of this project without informing Pakistan is a direct
violation of the IWT230 and adds that the project will decrease water flows of
the Jhelum River in Kharif season, when water is needed most, and exceeds
the storage capacity allowed under the IWT.231 To this date, the water conflict
over this project between India and Pakistan remains unresolved by the
dispute resolution mechanism, which has now consumed a good 32 years.232
4.3. Baglihar Dam Project
The designs of this project were shared with Pakistan in 1992, and
Pakistan raised its objections to this project in the same year.233 The PIC took
12 years and in 2004 concluded that it could not resolve this dispute.234 Then,
at a later stage, governmental negotiations and diplomatic bilateral talks after
two rounds of talks also failed and decided to pursue the matter at a later stage
through a neutral expert in 2005.235 Within two more years, the neutral expert
gave its conclusion, and the issue was resolved in 2007.236 It is interesting to
note here that the neutral expert did allow certain changes in the design of the
Baglihar Dam but went against the explicit provisioned assertions of the
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IWT.237 For instance, the neutral expert maintained that through the Baglihar
Dam India could maintain a water level below the dead storage level for the
maintenance of the project,238 whereas the IWT explicitly states that “dead
storage shall not be depleted except in an unforeseen emergency. If so, it will
be refilled in accordance of the conditions of its initial fillings.”239
Experts such as IWT commissioners have noted that by repeatedly
pressing Pakistan toward bilateral talks, India has used delaying tactics to
complete the construction works of its projects so that major issues remain
redundant after the completion of the project. 240 This is mainly because
adjudications tend to hold back the raised issues if the project has incurred so
much cost or has been completed.241 The dispute resolution mechanism of the
IWT took 15 years to resolve this issue, and still an interpretation of a major
clause remained unresolved.
4.4. Kishanganga Dam Project
In the case of the Kishanganga Dam, India again did not inform
Pakistan of the commencement of construction works, nor did it share any
designs or planning. Pakistan objected to this project in 1988,242 while India
formally shared its relevant information in 1994. 243 India successfully
transformed this project’s purpose from a storage facility to a run-of-the-river
power production unit in 2006.244 In 2010, Pakistan determined that the PIC
had been unsuccessful in resolving tensions over this project.245 The case was
referred to the PCoA, which took between two and three years to conclude the
case. 246 The dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT took 19 years to
resolve this case.247 Pakistan still has pending objections to this project, and
the World Bank to this date is currently deciding between Indian demands to
237
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install a neutral expert and Pakistan’s request to establish a CoA to resolve the
water conflicts of India and Pakistan over the Kishanganga and Ratle
projects.248
4.5. Chutak Project
Once again, in 2004 India started construction works on this project
without informing Pakistan and without sharing its plan and designs.249 After
frequent objections, India shared its information with Pakistan in 2007. 250
Through several PIC meetings, this issue was resolved in 2010. 251 The
dispute resolution mechanism took less time to resolve this issue—only two
years.
It is noted through the discussion in this section that Pakistan is currently
facing two major problems against the dispute resolution mechanism. The
first issue is that India commences its construction works without informing
Pakistan, which delays the possibility to raise issues in a timely manner. By
the time Pakistan is formally informed of the design and plans of project on
the western rivers, India has substantially completed its works and has
incurred so much cost that the projects cannot be held back.252 This practice
is against the obligation under the IWT,253 where India is obliged to share data
regarding any planned works over the western rivers as soon as possible,
which is noted as six months before any commencement of construction
works under the IWT. 254 The second issue is that the dispute resolution
mechanism itself is a very slow legal framework under the IWT, which can
take more than a decade to resolve an issue. Experts have noted that these
reasons delay justice, while delays in providing information on designs and
plans from the Indian side adversely affect Pakistani interests and defeat the
purpose of any dispute resolution mechanism.255
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5. Compliance with the Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the IWT
To recommend the effective use of the dispute resolution mechanism
under the IWT, this section analyzes Indian obligations under the IWT and
explores Indian and Pakistani arguments that the dispute resolution
mechanism is ineffective. In order to build such a nexus, the inefficacy of the
legal framework under the IWT, Indian obligations under the IWT and certain
provisions of the IWT will be set out within this section. Furthermore, brief
recommendations to make the existing framework more effective at resolving
disputes will be briefly proposed in this section.
The IWT explicitly obliges India to communicate relevant information
with Pakistan in a timely manner. 256 Article VII(2) of the IWT reads as
follows:
If either Party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause
interference with the waters of any of the Rivers and which, in its opinion,
would affect the other Party materially, it shall notify the other Party of its
plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as may be available and
as would enable the other Party to inform itself of the nature, magnitude and
effect of the work. If a work would cause interference with the waters of any
of the Rivers but would not, in the opinion of the Party planning it, affect the
other Party materially, nevertheless the Party planning the work shall, on
request, supply the other Party with such data regarding the nature, magnitude
and effect, if any, of the work as may be available.257
Similarly, Annexure D, Paragraph 9, of the IWT states as follows:
To enable Pakistan to satisfy itself that the design of a Plant conforms to
the criteria mentioned in Paragraph 8, India shall, at least six months in
advance of the beginning of construction of river works connected with the
Plant, communicate to Pakistan, in writing, the information specified in
Appendix II to this Annexure. If any such information is not available or is
not pertinent to the design of the Plant or to the conditions at the site, it will
be so stated.258
Likewise, Annexure E, Paragraph 12, provides a similar statement
regarding the construction works of storage facilities, which obliges India to
share data at least six months before their commencement.259
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As mandated under the IWT, if India does not violate this bilaterally
agreed treaty and shares relevant information of designs and plans of
construction works with Pakistan at least six months before their
commencement, the dispute resolution mechanism can resolve water conflicts
quickly between India and Pakistan260 Conversely, India deliberately starts
construction works on the western rivers without informing Pakistan, so that
Pakistan cannot raise timely objections, and when the objections reach the
highest available forum the resolution cannot go against Indian interests since
destruction of a project after its completion is never pursued, as hydro
management power projects are built at very high prices.261
On the other hand, India argues that Pakistan’s frequent objections to
every Indian project raise the costs of these projects by delaying their
construction processes. 262 However, this Indian concern can be easily
resolved if the designs of Indian projects are shared in a timely manner with
Pakistan, so that any difference or dispute is resolved even before the
commencement of a project.
Both India and Pakistan are obliged to follow prescribed principles and
obligations under the IWT, which is a bilaterally agreed treaty between both
sovereign states. 263 To a large extent, water conflicts between India and
Pakistan involve interpretation of treaty in the context of designs of Indian
projects on the western waters, which are objected to by Pakistani authorities
to ensure that their water supplies are not constricted within the true spirit of
the IWT.264
India argues that Pakistan only desires to increase the construction costs
of Indian projects by levying stay orders, and consequently delaying
construction works. 265 On the other hand, Pakistan argues that India is
robbing Pakistan’s water supplies by constructing water management
infrastructure over the western waters, and the designs of these projects are in
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clear violation of the IWT. 266 Pakistan adds that India does not share
concerned information in a timely manner about the designs and plans of the
construction works, which is a blatant violation of the IWT, so Pakistan cannot
effectively acquire resolution against illegitimate projects. 267 India further
uses the delaying tactic of bilateral talks, where negotiations go on for years
over a single issue.268
For these reasons, it is noted that these governmental tactics have
adversely affected the dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT, since the
resolution of a dispute under the IWT can take as long as nearly two decades
to resolve a single issue. After such a long span of time, usually the Indian
construction works have been completed or nearly so.269
The PIC and governmental negotiations, as dispute resolution
mechanisms, 270 are cost-effective and therefore very much desirable. 271
Nonetheless, these forums should not take decades to conclude their
resolution of any difference or dispute. Both forums should communicate
their ability or inability in less than two years. After that, the dispute should
be resolved or referred to the higher dispute resolution forums of neutral
expert and CoA, but only if information regarding water management projects
is shared in a timely manner with Pakistan, that is, at least six months before
commencement of any project; 272 only then can the dispute resolution
mechanism be made more effective.
Within this context, by understanding the nexus between the violation of
the IWT and the inefficacy of dispute resolution mechanism, CoA in the
Kishanganga project case established that India is obliged to exchange
relevant information in a timely manner.273 More specifically, the court held
that, in general, India should share the designs and plans of its construction
works over the western rivers at least six months prior to the commencement
of any construction works.274 In this sense, Pakistan would be satisfied with
266
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the compliance of these projects with the IWT, and would be better able to
raise objections and subsequently acquire their resolutions in a timely and
effective manner.275
Conclusion
There are certain legal mechanisms available in international law that can
peacefully resolve water conflicts between nations. 276 There is always an
option for states to personally resolve their conflicts with diplomatic
negotiations to resolve the tensions. 277 This method is usually the first
available recourse to placate international tensions.278 This forum includes
approaches such as diplomatic negotiations, mediation, fact-finding
commissions, and other similar intermediary techniques; 279 this preliminary
stage is nonbinding.280 There is a long list of water conflicts between India
and Pakistan regarding Indian infrastructure on the western tributaries. 281
Pakistan is of the view that India is robbing Pakistan’s water supplies and
building its water management capacity only as a political maneuver to gain
political supremacy by practicing hydro-hegemony. 282 On the other hand,
India maintains that it is only constructing infrastructure within the scope of
the IWT, and the decreased water flows in Pakistan are due to climate
change. 283 Therefore, water disputes are routinely referred to the legal
mechanism prescribed in the IWT.284
For these reasons, both states are still facing certain challenges. Within
the parameters inscribed in the IWT, India believes that Pakistan has no basis
for objecting to its construction works, to obtain stay orders, and to delay the
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construction works.285 Through these delays, the actual and opportunity costs
of projects are borne by the Indian state, which is injuring Indian interests and
economy.286 On the other side, Pakistan maintains that the dispute resolution
mechanism is very slow, and by the time the case reaches the highest forum,
either the project is completed or it has incurred so much cost that it cannot
be held back.287 In addition, even if the court sides with issues raised by
Pakistan, all it does is make slight changes to a few designs of Indian
projects.288
The Indian state is exasperated with Pakistan’s frequent objections and
feels that the IWT is an impediment to its interests.289 Therefore, India has
threatened that it will scrap the IWT entirely.290 In response, Pakistan has
stated that such a revocation of a bilaterally-agreed treaty would be considered
an act of war.291 To communicate state interests with regard to water disputes,
the PIC is tasked with communicating with each state.292 This extraordinary
intensity in political rigidity between Pakistan and India has an enshrined legal
framework to alleviate water disputations.293
To conclude, the mechanism of dispute resolution in the IWT involves
several stages, which includes a permanent commission, a neutral expert,
diplomatic negotiations, and international arbitration.294 The IWT has a fourlayer dispute resolution mechanism, where each layer encompasses a forum
to settle the dispute peacefully.295 At the first stage, a permanent commission
under the IWT resolves any question of fact that, if established, could violate
the provisions of the IWT.296 The difference of interests and objections of a
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party are termed a “question” at the first stage, which is to be resolved by the
PIC. 297 If the commission fails to resolve the raised question, then a
“difference” has arisen, and the difference between India and Pakistan under
the IWT is to be determined by mediation, through a neutral expert, which is
the second forum to resolve the issue.298 In the third stage, if the neutral expert
fails to resolve the difference, then a dispute has arisen between these two
states, and now the dispute is to be resolved by diplomatic negotiations
between the parties to the IWT, by mediation, or by the Court of Arbitration
(CoA), at the discretion of the PIC.299 This means that, if the dispute is not
resolved by governmental negotiations or mediation, the fourth, and last, stage
in the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT is to resolve water
disputes through the CoA.300 Stage four is the highest available forum under
the IWT to resolve water conflicts between India and Pakistan.301 The CoA
can rely on the IWT, international conventions to which both India and
Pakistan are parties and customary international law.302
This immersion of international law in the CoA is a platform to
encompass emerging contemporary needs and issues, while accommodating
developing water apportionment principles and rules. For instance, in the
Kishanganga case, the PCoA relied on the case law of the Pulp Mills case.303
Alongside this, the multilayered dispute resolution of the IWT is in
accordance with international laws and universally acclaimed rules. For
example, Article 33 of the UNWC also allows parties to use several stages of
forums to resolve their disputes.304 Article 33 of the UNWC offers a range of
dispute resolution mechanisms, which involve bilateral agreement,
negotiations, mediation, conciliation, and obligatory fact-finding joint
commissions.305 However, both India and Pakistan have concerns with the
UNWC, most specifically with the binding and compulsory nature of Article
33.306
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Moreover, the multilayered dispute resolution under the IWT reflects
acceptable forums and techniques of international law and globally practiced
customs. For example, under the IWT, the role of a neutral expert for
mediation, the obligation of the PIC as a permanent joint fact-finding
commission, the involvement of mediation and negotiations as diplomatic
negotiations and mediation, and the establishment of the CoA, 307 are all
reflections of widely used dispute resolution mechanisms for water conflicts
around the world.
It is pertinent to note that the dispute-resolution mechanism under the
IWT undertakes both juridical and non-judicial techniques to settle
differences and disputes between India and Pakistan. By allowing a four-layer
legal dispute-resolution framework, 308 the IWT encompasses almost all
binding and nonbinding legal procedures to settle water conflicts,309 except
for the dispute resolution forum of the ICJ since the IWT deliberately does
not accommodate ICJ as a legal forum to settle disputes.310 Apart from this,
the IWT gives substantial consideration to bilateral agreements and
diplomatic negotiations as a nonbinding forum to settle disputes 311 and it
allows arbitration and the neutral expert as binding procedures to resolve
water disputes between India and Pakistan.312
It is noted through the discussion in this paper that Pakistan is currently
facing two major problems with the dispute resolution-mechanism. The first
issue is that India commences its construction works without informing
Pakistan, which delays the possibility to raise issues in a timely manner.313
By the time Pakistan is formally informed of the design and plans of the
project on the western rivers, India has substantially completed its works and
has incurred so much cost that hydraulic projects cannot be held back.314 This
practice is against the obligation under the IWT,315 where India is obligated
to share data regarding any planned works on the western rivers as soon as
307
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possible.316 The second issue is that the dispute-resolution mechanism itself
is a very slow framework, which can take more than a decade to resolve a
single issue. Experts have noted that these reasons delay justice, and the delay
in the provision of information on designs and plans from the Indian side
adversely affects Pakistani interests. This defeats the purpose of any disputeresolution mechanism.317
As obligated under the IWT,318 if India does not violate this bilaterallyagreed treaty and share relevant information of designs and planning of
construction works with Pakistan in a timely manner at least six months before
the commencement of construction works, 319 the dispute-resolution
mechanism can quickly resolve water conflicts between India and Pakistan.
India argues that Pakistan only desires to increase the construction costs
of Indian projects by levying stay orders, which consequently delay
construction works.320 However, this Indian concern can be easily resolved if
the designs of Indian projects are shared in a timely manner with Pakistan, so
that any difference or dispute can be resolved even before the commencement
of a project. Furthermore, Pakistan argues that India is robbing Pakistan’s
water supplies by constructing water-management infrastructure on the
western waters, even though the designs of these projects are in clear violation
of the IWT.321 Pakistan adds that India does not share concerned information
in a timely manner on the designs and plans of construction works, which is
in blatant violation of the IWT, so that Pakistan cannot effectively acquire
resolution against illegitimate projects. 322 India further uses the delaying
tactic of bilateral talks, where negotiations go on for years over a single
issue.323
For these reasons, it can be determined that these governmental tactics
have adversely affected the dispute-resolution mechanism of the IWT, since
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the resolution of a dispute under the IWT can take as long as nearly two
decades. After such a long span of time, the Indian construction works are
usually completed or nearly so.324
To hasten the dispute-resolution mechanism, the forums of bilateral talks
and negotiations, and PIC should not take decades to conclude their resolution
of any difference or dispute. Both forums should communicate their ability
or inability in less than two years. After that, the dispute should be resolved
or referred to the higher dispute-resolution forums of the neutral expert or the
CoA.
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